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Department of Defence

Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program

Certificate Extension Report
Supplementing Certification Report 2000/11

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Chapter 1 - Executive Summary

1.1 Overview

- 1 This report reviews five Security Impact Analysis reports provided by BAE Systems against the Interactive Link – Multiple Computer Switch (IL-MCS). The IL-MCS was evaluated by the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP) at E6 under the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC).
- 2 This report concurs with BAE Systems findings that all listed changes are classified as ‘Minor’ and that therefore certificate extension is the correct path to continuity of assurance for the product. This report concludes that the following versions of IL-MCS have maintained the ITSEC E6 level of assurance:
 - a) Version 3.2 Release 3.2.0 (Part Number FID004)
 - b) Version 3.2 Release 3.2.1 (Part Number FID004)
 - c) Version 3.2 Release 3.2.2 (Part Number FID004)
 - d) Version 3.2 Release 3.2.3 (Part Number FID004)
 - e) Version 3.3 Release 3.3.0 (Part Number FID004)
 - f) Version 1.2 Release 1.2.0 (Part Number FID104)
- 3 A change that occurred was rebranding of the product line from Tenix to BAE Systems. As a part of that change an updated Security Target (ST) has been provided. The ST has replaced Tenix branding with that of BAE Systems, but contains the same content as the original document and therefore only refers to the FID004 part. The FID104 part was introduced later in the previous certificate extension.

Chapter 2 - Introduction

2.1 Purpose

- 4 This document is an addendum to the Certification Report (Ref [1]) and Certification Extension Report (Ref [2]) that describes the relevant baseline evaluation of Interactive Link Multiple Computer Switch (IL-MCS) FID004, Tempest variant FID104, Veto variant MCX FID204 and subsequent certificate extension of these products.
- 5 The purpose of this Certificate Extension Report is to describe the status of assurance continuity activities undertaken by BAE Systems for IL-MCS Versions FID004 (V3.3.0), FID104 (V1.2.0) and FID204 (V1.0.2) against the requirements of the AISEP Certificate Extension (ACE) program as

described in AISEP Publication No. 1: Program Policy (AP1), AISEP Certificate Continuity (Ref [3]).

- 6 BAE Systems provided information about their assurance continuity activities in the form of five Security Impact Analysis reports (SIAs). These SIAs (Ref [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8]) list the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.
- 7 This report should be read in conjunction with
- a) The certified TOE's Certification Report (Ref [1]).
 - b) The certified TOE's Certificate Extension Report (Ref [2]).
 - c) The certified TOE's Security Target (Ref [9]) which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the baseline evaluation.

2.2 Identification

- 8 Table 1 provides identification details for the maintained TOE and the certified TOE.

Table 1: Identification Information

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
Maintained TOE	Interactive Link Multiple Computer Switch, variants: FID004 V3.3.0 FID104 V1.2.0 FID204 V1.0.2
Developer	BAE Systems
Certified TOE	Interactive Link Multiple Computer Switch, variants: FID004 V3.1.7 FID104 V1.1.7 FID204 V1.0.2
Security Target	Interactive Link Multiple Computer Switch Security Target, BAE Systems, Issue 3.1, 8 May 2009
Evaluation Level	E6
Certificate Number	2000/11

Chapter 3 - SIA Summary

3.1 Description of Changes

- 9 The five Security Impact Analysis reports indicated that the Interactive Link (IL) VETO MXS FID204 variant had been removed from the TOE, and that all listed changes had no impact on the TOE Security Policy. The SIA's record the following changes:

3.1.1 IL-MCS-SIA-010

- a) Changes affecting both IL-MCS FID004 and IL Tempest MCS FID104 were:
 - i) Changes to the configuration list because of removal of VETO MXS FID204 components;
 - ii) Adding a Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) label, updating electronic component manufacturer's part numbers, and the addition of functionally equivalent components to use lead free components;
 - iii) Updating the IL Products Configured Items List and Approved Sources Listing; and
 - iv) Adding the WEEE label to the MCS Assembly Parts List and MCS Assembly Drawing.
- b) Removal of VETO MXS FID204 from the baseline TOE.

3.1.2 IL-MCS-SIA-11

- a) This SIA affects only IL-MCS FID004. Changes were:
 - i) Two sets of screws on the front panel were changed to longer variants; and
 - ii) The Approved Sources List was updated to reflect this change.

3.1.3 IL-MCS-SIA-12

- a) This SIA affects only IL-MCS FID004. The only change was:
 - i) Correction of the datapack description of the material the compliance label is printed upon.

3.1.4 IL-MCS-SIA-13

- b) This SIA affects only IL-MCS FID004. Changes were:
 - i) Correction of the datapack documents; and

- ii) Addition of a new ITAR export control warning sheet to the MCS Shippable Parts List.

3.1.5 IL-MCS-SIA-14

- c) This SIA affects only IL-MCS FID004. The only change was:
 - i) Change of the TOE livery to replace Tenix branding with BAE Systems branding.

3.2 Documentation Updated

3.2.1 IL-MCS-SIA-010

- a) **Configuration Management Deliverables:** Removal of VETO MXS FID204 references from IL-MCS Products Configured Items List, the IL Approved Sources Listing, the MCS Assembly Parts Listing and the MCS Assembly Drawing.
- b) **Guidance Documentation Deliverables:** Removal of VETO MXS FID204 references from IL-MCS Guidance Documentation.

3.2.2 IL-MCS-SIA-11

- a) **Configuration Management Deliverables:** Changes to the IL-MCS Products Configured Items List and the Front Panel drawing to show the use of longer screws.

3.2.3 IL-MCS-SIA-12

- a) **Configuration Management Deliverables:** Changes to the IL-MCS Products Configured Items List and the Compliance Label drawing to show correct detail.

3.2.4 IL-MCS-SIA-13

- a) **Configuration Management Deliverables:** Updates to the IL-MCS Products Configured Items List and the Approved Sources List.

3.2.5 IL-MCS-SIA-14

- a) **Configuration Management Deliverables:** Updates to the IL-MCS Products Configured Items List, Front Panel Schematic Diagram, MCS Schematic Diagram, IL Front Panel Panelisation Drawing, IL Front Panel Circuit Card Assembly Parts List, MCS Assembly Parts List, MCS Circuit Card Assembly Parts List and MCS Programmed Switch Circuit Card Assembly Parts List.
- b) **Guidance Documentation Deliverables:** Updating of MCS Guidance Documentation to include new company names and logos.

Chapter 4 - Assurance Continuity

4.1 Assurance Continuity Result

- 10 After consideration of the SIA's provided by BAE Systems the Australasian Certification Authority (ACA) has determined that the changes made to Interactive Link Multiple Computer Switch which are identified in this report meet the requirements of the ACE program.
- 11 The ACA agrees that the resultant change in the TOE can be classified as minor and that certificate extension is the correct path to continuity of assurance. The ACA agrees that the original assurance result is maintained for BAE Systems IL-MCS Versions FID004 (V3.3.0), FID104 (V1.2.0) and FID204 (V1.0.2).

References and Abbreviations

A.1 References

- [1] Certification Report 2000/11, Australasian Certification Authority, Issue 1.0, March 2000
- [2] Certification Extension Report, Australasian Information Security Evaluation program, Version 4.0, August 2006
- [3] AISEP Publication No. 1: Program Policy
- [4] Security Impact Assessment IL-MCS-SIA-010, 10 November 2008 for Interactive Link
- [5] Security Impact Assessment IL-MCS-SIA-11, 10 November 2008 for Interactive Link
- [6] Security Impact Assessment IL-MCS-SIA-12, 10 November 2008 for Interactive Link
- [7] Security Impact Assessment IL-MCS--13, 10 November 2008 for Interactive Link
- [8] Security Impact Assessment IL-MCS-14, 10 November 2008 for Interactive Link
- [9] Interactive Link Multiple Computer Switch Security Target, BAE Systems, Issue 3.1, 8 May 2009

A.2 Abbreviations

ACA	Australasian Certification Authority
AISEP	Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
CC	Common Criteria
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
SIA	Security Impact Analysis
TOE	Target of Evaluation
WEEE	Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment