



**Australian Government**  
**Department of Defence**

# **Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program**

## **Certificate Extension Report**

**Interactive Link - 100 MB Data Diode Device  
(FID003)**

**Supplementing Certification Report 1999/10**

**April 2010**  
Version 1.0

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## Chapter 1 - Executive Summary

- 1 This report reviews three Security Impact Analysis reports provided by BAE Systems Australia against the Interactive Link – Data Diode Device (IL-DDD) part number FID003. The IL-DDD was evaluated by the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP) at E6 under the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) (Ref [1]).
- 2 This report concurs with BAE Systems Australia findings that all listed changes are classified as ‘Minor’ and the certificate extension is the correct path for continuity of assurance for the product. This report concludes that the following versions of IL-DDD have maintained the ITSEC E6 level of assurance:
  - Version 1.2 Release 1.2.1
  - Version 2.0 Release 2.0.0
  - Version 2.0 Release 2.0.1
  - Version 2.1 Release 2.1.0
  - Version 2.1 Release 2.1.1
  - Version 2.1 Release 2.1.3
  - Version 2.1 Release 2.1.4
  - Version 2.1 Release 2.1.5
  - Version 2.2 Release 2.2.0
  - Version 2.3 Release 2.3.0
  - Version 2.4 Release 2.4.0
- 3 Changes that occurred was rebranding of the product line from Tenix to BAE Systems, as well as surface finish materials and process changes to enable this to be Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) compliant. As a part of those changes an updated Security Target (ST) has been provided. The ST has replaced Tenix branding with that of BAE Systems, but contains the same content as the original document and therefore only refers to the FID003 part.

## Chapter 2 - Introduction

### 2.1 Purpose

- 4 This document is an addendum to the certification report (Ref [1]) and Certification Extension Report (Ref [2]) that describes the relevant baseline evaluation of the Interactive Link - 100MB Data Diode Device and subsequent certificate extension of these products.
- 5 The purpose of this Certificate Extension report is to describe the status of assurance continuity activities undertaken by BAE Systems Australia for Interactive Link - 100MB Data Diode Device, against the requirements of the AISEP Certificate Extension (ACE) program as described in AISEP Publication No. 1: Program Policy (AP1), AISEP Certificate Continuity (Ref [7]).
- 6 BAE Systems Australia provided information about their assurance continuity activities in the form of three Security Impact Analysis reports (SIA). The SIA (Ref [3], [4] & [5]) lists the changes made to the certified Target of Evaluation (TOE), the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.
- 7 This report should be read in conjunction with:
  - a) The certified TOE's Certified Report (Ref [1])
  - b) The certified TOE's Certificate Extension Report (Ref [2]) and
  - c) The certified TOE's Security Target (Ref [6]) which provides a full description of the security requirements and specification that were used as the basis of the baseline evaluation.

## Chapter 3 - Identification

- 8 Table 1 identification details for the certified TOE and the maintained TOE.

Item	Details
<b>Evaluation Scheme</b>	Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
<b>TOE</b>	Interactive Link Data Diode Device, variants: FID003 V2.1.5 FID103 V1.0.2
<b>Developer</b>	BAE Systems Australia
<b>Security Target</b>	Data Diode Device Security Target, CAPO C438761 BAE Systems, Issue 3.1, 8 May 2009
<b>Assurance Level</b>	ITSEC E6
<b>Certificate Number</b>	1999/10
<b>Maintained TOE</b>	Interactive Link Data Diode Device (IL-DDD) August 2006 FID003 2.4.0 FID103 1.0.2

# Chapter 4 - Description of Changes

## 4.1 Changes

- 9 The three Security Impact Analysis reports indicated that the Interactive Link (IL) VETO DD FID103 variant had been removed from the TOE and that all listed changes had no impact on the TOE Security Policy. The SIA's record the following changes:

### 4.1.1 IL-DDD Version 2.2, Release 2.2.0 (FID003)

- 10 The changes included in this release were based on IL-DDD Version 2.2 Release 2.2.0.
- i) Adding a Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) label, updating electronic component manufacturer's part numbers and the addition of functionally equivalent components to use lead free components;
  - ii) Updating the IL products configured items list and approved sources listing;
  - iii) Adding the WEEE label to the IL-DDD assembly parts list and IL-DDD assembly drawing.

### 4.1.2 VETO DD Version 1.0, Release 1.0.2 (FID103)

- 11 The changes included in this release were based on IL-DDD Version 1.0 Release 1.0.2.
- The Veto DD product variant has been frozen at issued to version 1.0.2.

### 4.1.3 IL-DDD Version 2.3, Release 2.3.0 (FID003)

- 12 The changes included in this release were based on IL-DDD Version 2.3, Release 2.3.0.
- Small changes made to the case including changes to artwork and labels.

### 4.1.4 IL-DDD Version 2.4, Release 2.4.0 (FID003)

- 13 The changes included in this release were based on IL-DDD Version 2.4, Release 2.4.0. One of the changes was to the Target of Evaluation by changing the outside casing. This change does not impact a security enforcing functionality.
- In most cases the changes are due to the selection of RoHS compliant fasteners, metalwork finishes and processes. As part of this process the manufacturer's part number has had minor changes.
  - The US export control warning information card has been removed as this is no longer needed.

## **Chapter 5 - Certification**

### **5.1 Assurance Continuity Result**

- 14 After consideration of the Security Impact Analysis reports provided by BAE Systems Australia, the Australasian Certification Authority (ACA) has determined that the design changes of the product did not alter the certified security functionality of the TOE and hence the impact is of a minor nature.
  
- 15 The ACA agrees that the resultant change in the TOE can be classified as minor and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance. The ACA agrees that the original assurance result is maintained for BAE Systems Australia product Interactive Link - 100MB Data Diode Device version FID003 (2.4.0).

# **Annex A - References and Abbreviations**

## **A.1 References**

- [1] Certification Report 1999/10, Australasian Certification Authority, Issue 1.0 November 1999.
- [2] Certificate Extension Report, Australasian Information Security Evaluation program, August 2006
- [3] Security Impact Analysis report IL-DDD-sia09, 11 June 2009
- [4] Security Impact Analysis report IL-DDD-sia10, 11 June 2009
- [5] Security Impact Analysis report IL-DDD-sia11, 5 January 2010.
- [6] Data Diode Device Security Target, CAPO C438761 BAE Systems, Issue 3.1, 8 May 2009
- [7] AISEP Publication No. 1: Program Policy
- [8] CCIMB-2004-02-009 Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements version 1.0 February 2004

## **A.2 Abbreviations**

ACA	Australasian Certification Authority
AISEP	Australasian Information Security Evaluation program
CC	Common Criteria
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IAR	Impact Analysis Report
ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
RoHS	Restriction of Hazardous Substances
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
WEEE	Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment